Introduction
In the past 20 years, there has been considerable research into the effects of food recalls on consumer demand, perhaps due to the increase in the number of recalls over the same period. From 1996 to 2016, the meat and poultry industry witnessed an increasing trend in the number of recalls. The Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) reports that, despite industry and government efforts to safeguard food, product contamination by adulterants continues to be an ongoing concern (USDA, 2016) . Food safety issues can result in severe economic losses to food companies and even worse social costs for society, ranging from company bankruptcy to consumer illness or death. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that each year roughly 1 in 6 Americans (or 48 million people) get sick, 128,000 are hospitalized, and 3,000 die from foodborne diseases (CDC, 2016) . Recalls are designed not only to protect consumers by removing contaminated product from commerce but also to incentivize companies to prevent foodborne disease outbreaks from happening.
It is hypothesized that recall events can lead to negative price impacts because the recalls suggest lower product quality or ineffective quality control, resulting in a loss of consumer confidence . In turn, traders in derivatives markets react to the sudden, negative news, resulting in a drop in futures prices for the implicated commodity. While there has been considerable research examining the effects of recalls on short-term price movements Lusk and Schroeder 2002; Moghadam et al. 2016) , there is no research on the cumulative impact recalls play in shifting long-term consumer demand preferences. Lusk and Schroeder (2002) concluded that if meat recalls resulted in a systematic change in the structural demand for meat, the change only occurs gradually and must be examined through an extended period of time. If recalls do have a more prolonged effect, then knowing this would help identify the effectiveness of recall policy. Therefore, this paper aims to build on existing literature by investigating the long-term impact of recalls on weekly live cattle futures markets using a recall index. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to analyze if additional meat recalls have long run impacts on weekly live cattle futures prices.
The following section presents a literature review related to the long-run impacts of recalls on futures market prices. This is followed by an account of the meat recall process, then the data used are described. Empirical methodology is explained followed by empirical results. Conclusions and further research are discussed in the last section.
Literature Review
An early, related literature, while not explicitly studying the impacts of recalls, identified health information as a demand factor in consumer response. Moschini and Meilke (1989) introduced modeling the structural change in demand for meat. In their seminal paper, they found that the dynamics of prices and incomes cannot fully explain consumer demand shifts from meat to chicken; however, dietary concerns provided the best explanation for shifts towards white meats. Kinnucan et al. (1997) examined the combined effects of advertising and health information on meat demand. Their study hypothesized that health information, such as linkages between cholesterol and heart disease, impacted beef demand, which was confirmed by the positive and negative cross-and own-price elasticity for poultry and beef, respectively. The first study conducted to see the short-run impact of health information was by Robenstein and Thurman (1996) , which revealed insignificant effects of Wall Street Journal articles on livestock futures markets. Food safety information differs, however, from health information in that such information, for example pathogenic contamination, can result in a short-term, a long-term, or fatal consequences. These events are mostly unanticipated and the shock severity may cause a considerable market reaction.
The shock of a food recall can cause a lack of consumer confidence, drive prices down and ultimately impact traders' decisions, which has been the focus among much research. For instance, Henson and Mazzocchi (2002) found that processors of beef, dairy and pet food products were negatively affected by the reported linkage between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) studied the effects of recalls on shareholder wealth to find that serious health concerns did cause a drop in stock prices. In a second paper, McKenzie and Thomsen (2001) concluded that wholesale prices were impacted by recalls, yet this impact did not transmit to farm-level derivative prices. On the other hand, using food recalls as a proxy for food quality, Lusk and Schroeder (2002) found that medium-sized, serious food recalls did impact short-run farm level derivatives prices for live cattle and lean hog. Furthermore, Moghadam et al. (2013) revisited the McKenzie and result to find that there was, in fact, a significant reaction in live cattle futures markets from E. coli 0157:H7 contamination. The researchers of the more recent publications concluded that modeling the role of recalls on futures prices was incomplete without the introduction of gradual effects. This finding suggests further investigation into the long-term effect of meat recalls.
There are a number of studies that explore the long-run effects of food safety on meat demand, many of which utilized food safety indexes for empirical methodology. One of the principal studies in this branch of research is Burton and Young (1996) , which used media articles and popular press to measure the impact of food safety on beef demand. In their AIDS model, they found a short and long-term effect of publicity on consumer expenditure for meat and a drop in meat market share. Flake and Patterson (1999) extended the literature concerning the effects of BSE, E. coli, and salmonella on meat demand by studying Associated Press articles. Both of these papers found a negative impact on demand, confirming that the market responds to food safety occurrences, and media informational indexes have effective explanatory power. Piggott and Marsh (2004) incorporated similar empirical methodology with a food safety index for publicized recalls. Overall, their paper revealed small changes over time in average consumer response to food safety with some periods of large, short-lived impacts. Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert (2004) built upon this research by examining demand responses to food recalls from newspaper articles and FSIS meat product recalls. While meat product recalls significantly impacted demand, with elasticity measures indicating a change from meat to non-meat consumption, media indices had no effect.
The early literature analyzed prices following USDA announcements, while more recent studies have incorporated media articles as a primary source of consumer information and decision making. Schlenker and Villa-Boas (2009) compared the two information sources and found that independent news media created a more adverse impact on prices than a government report warning of the first BSE outbreak. Nevertheless, government reports on food scares are typically the first information traders and consumers have access to. Therefore, it is still believed that USDA recall announcements contain relevant information to gauge how market participants respond to food safety events. This study will follow the recent literature in that an index measure will be used to quantify the food safety impact. However, being that information contained in the reports (recall size, severity and description) has consistently yielded significant results, the index will only include information that market participants could access through the USDA announcements.
The existing literature has succeeded in determining the immediate market response of meat recalls on futures market prices. It is hypothesized in this paper that current cattle prices reflect many factors, one of which being food recalls from years past. It is, then, believed that the indexed effect of cumulative recalls will give a more accurate representation of how traders update prices in response to new outbreaks. Specifically, the results will show the revenue lost by cattle producers due to an increase or decrease in an index of recall events over the past two years. This is possible through using a rolling index, allowing for the inclusion of all recalls within a 24-month time window.
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Recall Background
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is an agency of USDA that handles product recalls for meat, poultry and egg products. According to FSIS's recall policy, a recall can begin in several different ways. First, the company can identify an adulterant or other product defect and notify USDA officials immediately. FSIS will investigate the claim and issue a Recall Notification Report (RNR) for non-serious, Class III recalls or publish a press release if the recall is serious (Class I or II). The recall process can also begin with FSIS, the state government, or third party plant inspectors identifying a non-compliance issue that warrants product removal (USDA, 2016).
The RNR or Recall Release contains all the information concerning the recall, such as company, reason for recall, date of recall, method of discovery, recall class, pounds recalled, reported consumer illness, and other related information. In addition to the reason for the recall and product, each report notifies the public of the recall severity by categorizing the event into one of three groups: Class I, Class II or Class III. According to the FSIS website, "A Class I recall involves a health hazard situation in which there is a reasonable probability that eating the food will cause health problems or death" (USDA, 2016). Class II involves a contaminant that presents a remote probability of health concern and Class III involves situations expected to result in no negative health side effects. After a report has been issued on the size and class of the recall, FSIS works with the company throughout the recall process to ensure all contaminated products are removed from commerce before lifting the ban.
Data
Weekly Futures
Using Datastream software, weekly live cattle futures prices were gathered from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). CME contains information for different commodities, contracts and frequency. Specifically, live cattle contracts were presented in daily, weekly and monthly increments for expiration months of February, April, June, August, October and December. A frequency of weekly prices better fits the frequency of recall announcements and abstracts from the noise of daily price changes. To organize prices into a continuous series, contracts were rolled over to the next nearest contract at the start of the expiration month. Following the logic of the previous literature, it is believed that futures prices-specifically, live cattle futures-will respond most strongly to a USDA recall.
USDA Catalogue
The recall information was pulled from USDA's FSIS website catalogue of meat, poultry and egg recalls from 1982 through 2017. The Recall Case Archive provides summary information on completed recalls beginning in year 1994. We limit our examination of recalls to the period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2015. The information contained in each data frame is the press release information listed above, including company, reason for recall, date of recall, method of discovery, recall class, pounds recalled, and consumer illness -if there was one. For the purpose of this study, the information extracted and used for analysis will be company, date, recall class and pounds recalled for beef recalls. Beef recalls were selected because they remain a common source of food contamination, which the literature has already closely analyzed. Since recalls often necessitate the removal of multiple meat products, the criteria was restricted to include only beef-specific events. Table I summarizes the information we collected on beef recalls. The reasons for recalls range from labeling to bacteria contamination. From 1995 through 2015, the leading cause of beef recalls was E. coli O157:H7. The second leading reason for a recall fell in the category 'Other' which included misbranding, extraneous materials, or a non-lifethreatening chemical/spoilage exposure. Therefore, the data reflect higher class I and class II/III recalls for the former and latter, respectively. Table II displays a chart with the various types of recall reasons and number of occurrences for each.
Index Construction
Serious consideration and research was taken in developing our index. Lusk and Schroeder (2004) determined that seriousness and size of recall determine market response. Other papers, too, identified recall class and size as key variables in price response to food safety events. Pozo and Schroeder (2016) found recall size to be significant, causing abnormal stock returns to become more negative when increased by one percent. The literature consistently finds that recalls involving serious health consequences or death have significant impact on financial variables (Lusk, 2004; Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001; Pozo and Schroeder 2016) . Therefore, this study treats recall size and severity as primary measures for the index construction, yielding a higher index value for more serious recalls. Following Lusk and Schroeder (2004) , this paper includes size categories as follows: size1 = less than 1,162 lbs., size2 = between 1,162 and 4,516 lbs., size3 = between 4,516 and 32,000 lbs., size4 = between 32,000 and 175,288 lbs., and size5 = greater than 175,288 lbs. For each of these categories, we assign an index of odd numbers 1 through 9 with 9 being assigned to the category with the most pounds recalled. Next, we index the classes by 3, 2 and 1 for Class I, II and III, respectively, giving a larger weight to events more likely to cause a serious illness. These two numbers are then summed to arrive at the contribution to the index for each recall event.
The two-year frame for our index was divided into four subperiods that consist of 6 months of recall data for each group. All of the recalls in a six month period were summed together to find the total index measure per six months. Each subperiod is then weighted decreasingly by distance from the current week. The most recent 6 months have a weight of 1, the following 6 months a weight of .75, and the remaining two six month subperiods receive weights of .5 and .25, respectively. Then all the weighted values are summed to arrive at the final index value for that week.
In turn, this window will move through the entire dataset of recalls, re-indexing every week, creating an index based on a rolling window of two years of recalls. We calculated the index from December 31, 1996 through December 22, 2015, totaling 989 weekly observations.
Empirical Methodology
Based on demand theory, we treat the food safety index as a demand shifter. This method was successfully used by Marsh et al (2004) and Attavanich et al (2011) . We use a simple autoregressive model of live cattle futures prices with the addition of several exogenous variables. The explanatory variables included in this study were chosen from previous literature and economic theory, specifically as it relates to food recall events.
The main exogenous variable consists of a two-year accumulated recall index. Since beef, like most agricultural commodities, demonstrates seasonality, the empirical model also includes dummy variables for months, and yearly fixed effects were included to model inflation. The logarithm of the weekly price series was used as the dependent variable and, when tested for nonstationarity with an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, was found to be stationary. Two lagged values of logged futures prices were included as regressors to account for past prices influencing present prices. Modeled autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation graphs were the criteria used to justify the number of autoregressive dependent variables used. Thus, the equation used to model prices is given by ; 2 and 3 are the two lagged values of weekly logged futures prices, Montht are the seasonal monthly variables, Yeart are yearly fixed effects, and is the stochastic error term.
Empirical Results
Equation (1) is estimated using OLS. The main variable of interest, − , is statistically significant at the 5% level. The magnitude of effect is moderate with a -.0000893 impact on prices for a one unit increase in the index. The coefficient for the index variable is negative, which supports our hypothesis that an accumulation of recalls will put downward pressure on cattle prices. Table III provides a list of the variables with their corresponding significance and magnitude. Interpreted economically, if the index increases by 1 unit, we expect prices to change by -.0089%. Therefore, an additional recall, even of sizable and serious proportions (which can add at most 12 to the index), cannot increase the index enough to push farm-level prices downward by an economically significant amount according to these results. However, this percentage can be a sizable drop for any trader who has invested in a large quantity of cattle futures or options. Importantly, these results confirm our hypothesis that live cattle futures are adversely impacted by recalls over time. Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 05%, *** significant at 01%
Economic Impact
Fewer recalls means increased farm revenue, to the extent that higher futures prices translate into higher revenue to farmers. The weekly, monthly, and annual changes in index values were calculated to identify periods of change that would facilitate putting the results into economic context. The annual index changes in Table IV below give the cumulative changes over each year of recall information. The recall index increased the most in 1998 (80.75), while its biggest drop was in 2012 (-100.75) . Using all yearly index measures, the percentage change in futures prices was multiplied by the average settlement price for that year to calculate the average yearly loss or gain per hundredweight. That amounted to -$0.46/cwt and $1.10/cwt change in price for 1998 and 2012, respectively. Applying these numbers to USDA total disappearance statistics and the average yield of meat per cow 3 , cattlemen clearly suffered millions of dollars in losses from contaminated food. Elevated levels of recalls cost the cattle industry as much as $240 million in 1998. On the opposite side, by limiting severe recalls of serious health concerns, farm-level revenues are estimated to have increased $567 million in 2012. For the 19 years, changes in the level of recalls were responsible for decreasing revenue for 9 years and increasing it for 10. (2013) who finds E. coli O157:H7 recalls responsible for adverse returns in live cattle markets. Moreover, this study adds to his work by including some very large recalls that were excluded in the years studied in the previous literature.
Conclusions and Further Research
This study set out to investigate the gradual impact of recalls over an extended period of time, as was suggested by previous food safety literature. Our results offer important information for the cattle industry. Whereas before the impact of recalls on daily cattle prices was known and believed to be temporary, this research uncovers a more prolonged impact. Here, the results indicate not only a significant impact on weekly commodity prices, but it shows that accumulated recalls act together Thus, traders' responses to a recall event are based on present and past knowledge of food safety events for the same product. Consumer theory applied to the interaction between traders and consumers suggests that consumers are substituting meat for other products temporarily, or the market is experiencing a long-run structural change in meat caused by consumers' perceptions of meat due to recalls. The structural change hypothesis is consistent with Moschini and Meilke (1989) .
Rather than excluding relevant recalls, which is often necessary for event studies, no recalls were dropped from 1995 through 2015. This expanded data set is a significant contribution to this field of research. We provide results for the effect of beef recalls on the cattle industry over the past 20 years. Based on the results, recalls are costing cattle producers economically significant amounts of money when the losses to the industry as a whole are considered. Disaggregating these losses across individual farms may result in only marginal changes in farm revenue. Therefore, it is uncertain whether recall costs financially incentivize producers to invest in food safety safeguards.
Nevertheless, beef recalls adversely affect futures market prices for an extended period. And although it is unclear whether recall information is a concern to livestock farmers, the results here indicate that futures market participants react apprehensively over time to such food safety events. Furthermore, farm-level revenue is impacted by the continued discoveries and requested return of defected beef products.
